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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





ARVIL A. HARRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of attempting 
to receive stolen property, a class A misdemeanor, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6 408 (as amended 1973). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was arraigned before the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County and entered a plea of 
guilty to the reduced charge of attempting to receive 
stolen property. He requested a pre-sentence investigation. 
Subsequently the court received and reviewed the pre-sentence 
report and appellant came before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor 
for sentencing, whereupon appellant was ordered to pay a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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$1,000.00 fine and sentenced to a one-year term in the Salt 
Lake County Jail. 
Appellant thereafter duly filed a motion seeking 
an order allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and 
enter a not guilty plea; asking that the judgment be arrested, 
the sentence suspended, and the defendant be discharged; 
requesting a new trial, and seeking to examine and review 
the pre-sentence report and to have an opportunity to explain 
or rebut the derogatory allegations which he believed were 
contained therein. All motions were denied by the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court which 
refuses to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea 
and which affirms the judgment and sentence of the trial 
court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was originally charged with receiving 
stolen property, a third degree felony (R.6) After the com-
plaint was amended to charge attempting to receive stolen 
property, appellant waived preliminary hearing in the Salt 
Lake City Court and was bound over to the District Court 
for trial. To the charge contained in the information (R.8,9), 
appellant pled guilty and asked for a pre-sentence investiga-
tion and report (R.48-52). Approximately four weeks later, 
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he appeared before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor for sentenc-
ing, where he was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 fine and serve 
a one-year term in the court jail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ONCE THE TRIAL COURT HAD ACCEPTED A VALID GUILTY 
PLEA, THE DECISION TO VACATE THE PLEA LAY WITHIN THE SOUND 
DISCRETION OF THE COURT. 
Before accepting appellant's guilty plea to the 
charge of attempted theft by receiving stolen property, 
the trial court explained to appellant that his constitu-
tional rights would be affected, that some rights, such as 
a trial by jury, would be waived (R.49). The court included 
the following statement, pertinent in the case at bar: 
"You can't be forced to incriminate 
yourself in any manner, but by entering 
a plea of guilty you do incriminate 
yourself, and you admit the facts that 
~rt the crime charged." (R.49) 
(Emphasis added) 
Then, in order to meet the requirements of Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), that a guilty plea be knowingly 
and intelligently given, and Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 
452 P.2d 323 (1969), that the plea be made voluntarily, with-
out undue influence or coercion, the court interrogated 
appellant. 
"THE COURT: To the charge in the 
Information what is your plea, guilty 
or not guilty? 
-3-_ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. HARRIS: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Before the Court accepts 
that plea I'll ask you some questions. 
Were you present in the courtroom when I 
gave advice on constitutional rights? 
MR. HARRIS: Yes, I was. 
THE COURT: You understand those? 
MR. HARRIS: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Are you freely and 
voluntarily entering a plea at this time? 
MR. HARRIS: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: Has any promises been 
made to you to induce this plea? 
MR. HARRIS: No. 
THE COURT: Has any threats or 
coercion been made against you to induce 
this plea? 
MR. HARRIS: No. 
THE COURT: Are you presently under 
the influence of any drugs, narcotics, or 
alcoholic beverages? 
MR. HARRIS: No, I'm not. 
THE COURT: A plea of guilty is received 
by the Court. The Court finds that the 
Defendant freely and voluntarily entered the 
plea, that he's not presently under the in-
fluence of any drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic 
beverages, and I base those findings on my 
observations of the Defendant in the courtroom 
together with the questions that were asked 
of him and his responses thereto." (R.50-51) 
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Appellant now seeks release from the guilty plea 
and complains that the court did not make a determination 
that there were facts sufficient to warrant a finding of 
guilty before accepting his plea. Respondent asserts that 
the trial court fulfilled its duty under the law. It had 
before it the affidavit of the Chief Criminal Deputy County 
Attorney for Salt Lake County wherein William Hyde alleged 
that "the evidence in the case supports the charge made 
against the defendant named." (R.9). It had before it the 
appellant's plea of guilty, given after the admonishment to 
him that such a plea was an admission that the facts charged 
were true. Finally, it had before it the record of the case, 
which revealed that appellant was pleading to a reduced 
charge, the result of a negotiated plea. These factors 
provided a sufficient basis for the trial court's satisfaction 
that facts warranting a finding of guilty existed. Therefore, 
acceptance of the plea was proper and valid under State v. 
Forsythe, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977), which allows flexibility 
in plea-taking procedures: 
"We recognize, of course, that it 
is the duty of the trial court to see 
that the interests of justice are 
served by not allowing a person to 
enter a plea of guilty to a crime he 
has not committed. In performing 
that duty, the court is not bound to 
any rigidity of rule or procedure, 
but may do it in any manner consistent 
-5-
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with reason and fairness which he 
thinks will best accomplish that · 
urpose." 560 P.2d at 339 (Emphasis 
added 
Finally, counsel for appellant states that even 
at the time of sentencing the court made no inquiry into 
the facts of the crime or of appellant's culpability. 
However, before sentencing, defense counsel stated in his 
plea for leniency: 
"He [the appellant) has received 
the property involved in this case, 
and we admitted to that. I think 
there may be some indication on 
another occasion or two before that 
he received some property." (R.43) 
Appellant now insinuates that he had a defense 
of entrapment. He could have raised that issue when he 
entered his plea or at sentencing. He did not. What he 
did say at sentencing is recorded at T.44: 
"This is the first time that I 
have been a fence. Now if we can 
reconsider in this condition: This 
man--it was a stool pigeon." 
This court has consistently held that a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 
7 P.2d 825 (1932); State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977). 
As appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating 
abuse of tnat discretion, respondent urges rejection of his 
claim. 
-6-
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CURRENT LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF 
A CONFIDENTIAL PRE-SENTENCE REPORT WHERE THE COURT DOES NOT 
EXPLICITLY RELY UPON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN. 
Neither federal nor state law requires the dis-
closure of a pre-sentence report. United States v. Gardner, 
480 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 977, 38 
L.Ed.2d 220 states that Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure places the disclosure of pre-sentence 
reports within the discretion of the trial court and that 
denial of a defendant's request to inspect is not a due 
process violation. In Utah the disclosure issue has arisen 
on several occasions, and in each instance this court has 
found disclosure of the pre-sentence investigation report 
lying within the sound discretion of the trial court. Reddish 
v. Smith, 576 P.2d 859 (Utah 1978); State v. Doremus, 29 Utah 
2d 373, 510 P.2d 529 (1973). 
"In order that there be no doubt 
as to what we believe the proper 
rule, it is the opinion of this court 
that it be left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court to determine 
whether or not the contents of the 
pre-sentence investigation report 
should be furnished to the defendant 
in its entirety or such portions 
thereof as the court might deem 
appropriate." 510 P.2d at 529 
-7-
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The United States Supreme Court recently con-
sidered this issue in Gardner v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 
L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). Although relied upon by appellant, 
respondent asserts that Gardner is not dispositive, but dis-
tinguished on its facts. Gardner had been convicted of 
first degree murder, with the jury recommending a life 
sentence. Thereafter the trial judge disregarded the jury's 
advisory opinion and sentenced the defendant to death, rely-
ing in part on a pre-sentence investigation report, a con-
fidential portion of which was neither disclosed to nor 
requested by the defendant or his counsel. On appeal, the 
state supreme court affirmed the conviction and sentence, 
stating that the record had been carefully reviewed, 
although the confidential report had not been included in 
the record. 
The United .states Supreme Court vacated the death 
sentence, and while not agreeing on an opinion, six members 
of the court agreed that imposition of the death penalty 
in that case were invalid. 
Mr. Justice Stevens, speaking for three members 
of the Court, held that petitioner's due process was denied 
when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on 
the basis of information that he had no opportunity to deny 
-8-
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or explain. Because the death penalty is now recognized 
as a punishment different in kind from any other (see §regg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)), the 
capital sentencing procedure, as well as the trial, must 
satisfy due process. While the Court did not find any 
rationale in the Gardner case for withholding the report, 
the Court concluded that even if good cause for nondis-
closure did exist, it is constitutionally impermissible to 
exclude the confidential report from the record on appeal 
as the reviewing court would be unable to determine if the 
death penalty was being imposed evenhandedly. 
The instant case is not a capital case; it is a 
class A misdemeanor. Appellant faced a maximum one-year 
jail sentence, not extinction of his person. The Gardner 
requirements of full disclosure are inapplicable to the sen-
tencing procedures of a non-capital case, and sound discretion 
of the court is still the standard. 
The record contained no request by appellant for 
inspection of the pre-sentence report prior to sentencing. 
At sentencing the trial judge gave no indication whatsoever 
that he was relying upon the contents of the report and 
made no references to it. (Defense counsel concedes he 
has no knowledge that the report contained any inaccuracies 
or derogatory statements about appellant.) After listening 
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to a plea for leniency by defense counsel in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12 (1953 as amended) 1 , Judge Jaylor 
imposed the one-year sentence adding: 
"The operation of fencing in 
this community gives the common 
criminal an accessible source for 
the distribution of stolen goods 
and their effects. I would venture 
to say 95 percent of the burglaries 
that occur in this community are 
drug related, and the same spokes 
on the wheel keep coming by. 
The burglar burglarizing in 
order to sell property in order to 
buy drugs. I think this has got 
to stop. I am going to deny pro-
bation and coruuitt you forthwith 
to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
That will be the order of the court." 
(R.44) 
Clearly, the court imposed the maximum sentence 
because the "fences" in this community enable the burglars, 
who often need money for narcotics, to market their stolen 
goods and to that extent, provides a medium in which thieves 
can thrive. Respondent submits that the crime of receiving 
stolen property--or attempting to receive it--is not, as 
1 77-35-12. Discretion of court--Exercise.--When discretion 
is conferred upon the court as to the extent of punishment, 
the court, at the time of pronouncing judgment, may take 
into consideration any circumstances, either in aggrava-
tion or mitigation of the punishment, which may then be 
presented to it by either party. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appellant suggests, an ordinary crime against property; 
therefore, appellant's reliance on his first-offender status 
for leniency was misplaced. The professional fence, by his 
accessibility and his actual involvement, encourages thieves 
to steal and is thereby a vital link in this chain of crime. 
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, chose 
to remove the link and weaken the chain. 
Uta~ Code Ann. § 77-35-12 (1953 as amended and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-62-30 2 are not mutually exclusive. In corn-
plementing each other the former allows either party to 
present evidence specifically in aggravation or in mitigation 
of the punishment. The latter authorizes the court to 
request a pre-sentence investigation report from a neutral 
source, the division of corrections, with the resulting 
investigation likely to uncover both aggravating and mit-
igating factors. This unbiased report, with its recommenda-
tions, can then be used with the arguments of the interested 
2 77-62-30. clinics and exarninations.--The division of 
corrections shall establish and maintain clinics for the 
purpose of thoroughly investigating the social, rnenta~ and 
physical conditions and background of tho~e c~arged with 
the various crimes and shall conduct examinations wherever 
required, and, upon completing.such.an.examination, the 
division shall file a copy of its findings and formal 
clinical report with the court having.jurisdictio~ and make 
such recommendations to the court as it may see fi~. For 
this purpose the division may, ~ithout expense to it, com-
mand the services of an expert in the employ of the state 
of Utah or any other expert in the employ of any state 
institution. 
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parties and in a filtering and meshing process, determine 
the most appropriate sentence. Of course, a defendant may 
waive the pre-sentence report and be sentenced immediately. 
Respondent submits that these statutes can work 
in harmony and that disclosure of the confidential report to 
the defendant is unnecessary unless the trial judge states 
that he has relied on specific information contained therein, 
which revelation may force disclosure. However, that 
situation is not before the court. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court validly accepted a guilty 
plea and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing or in 
refusing to vacate the plea, respondent urges the court to 
affirm the judgment and sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSON 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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